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Introduction 
Some  recent applications of practice theory to education (Kemmis 2010 and 2012) draw on 
the work of Theodore Scahtzki and has offer a conceptualisation of the nature of schooling 
and the professional practice of teachers as an architecture and ecology of practices. This 
paper briefly outlines some of the main benefits of this application of practice theory but also 
some attendant problems – particularly the difficulty of characterising the personal 
dimensions of experience. We argue that Nelson Goodman’s work in the general theory of 
symbols provides a way of filling that gap and, further, that Goodman’s theory complements, 
and in turn needs to be complemented by, practice theory. After brief expositons of his 
theories of denotation, notation and exemplification, we show how they imply something like 
practices and that these can be conceptualised in ways consistent with his nominalistic 
system. 
Along the way we anchor the analyses in how the import of the following six sentences or 
assertions a teacher may make about themselves and their professional practice might be 
understood: 
1. I am a teacher 
2. What I do is what a teacher does. 
3. What I do is what a teacher should do. 
4. I am a good teacher. 
5. I do it my way. 
6. The way for others to comprehend what I do is by showing rather than telling. 
Practice theory 
Schatzki (2001) summarises a main motivation of the practice turn as a recognition of the 
need for alternatives to defining the social mainly in terms of individuals, or interactions, or 
language, or signifying systems, or the life world, or institutions and roles, or structures or 
systems. It seeks to move beyond problematic dualisms such as subject and object, or 
structure and agency, by characterising knowledge, meaning, power, language, social 
institutions and history as occurring within, and as aspects of, an organised array of activities 
-  that is, the total nexus of interconnected human practices. Practices in turn are embodied, 
materially mediated activity centrally organised around shared practical understandings. The 
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practice-skilled body is the common meeting point of mind and activity and of individual and 
society 
Schatzki’s own contributions have been firstly an elaboration of the later work of 
Wittgenstein (Schatzki 1996 and 1997) to argue that the meanings of words, feelings, and 
actions are established in practices and secondly to synthesise a good many of the strands of 
the practice turn (Schatzki 2002). He characterises practices as sayings, doings, 
understandings and purposes which take place in a contexture of many other associated 
practices and patterned physical arrangements The criteria of meanings are, he argues, given 
by practices and particular meanings are established in their use - that is as a performance of 
a certain practice. Meanings do not exist independently of practices. That is they are not in 
the head of an individual waiting to be expressed and they are not in some essence of the 
thing being denoted.. 
 
Schatzki makes a distinction between integrated and dispersed practices. Teaching, or 
doctoring, or neighbouring for example can be characterised as integrated in that they are 
sustained bundles of associated sayings, doings, understandings and purposes that take place 
in particular social sites. Questioning, listening, helping, betraying, and promising can be 
characterised as dispersed in that they thread through many different integrated practices. The 
sayings and understandings of integrated practices necessarily constitute projects with 
purposes and aspirations (Schatzki calls this teleo-affectivity) which in turn makes possible 
virtuous actions according to criteria internal to the practices, and also feelings such as pride, 
shame, disappointment, or guilt provoked by success or failure in relation to the practice as 
project. 
 
Practices make available certain identities. A person becomes (that is can successfully 
describe themselves as) a teacher, gymnast, or footballer by being acknowledged as a 
participant of an educational practice (e.g. schooling), gymnastics (e.g. competing in the 
Olympics) , or football (e.g. playing in goal for a team). But, as noted above, identities are 
not the only kinds of things that practices constitute. They also constitute schools and 
schooling as both concepts and as the buildings and spatial arrangements of individual 
institutions that variously realise those concepts as particular identities, classrooms, 
timetables, rules and regulations, criteria of worth, and purposes. 
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How long a practice is sustained varies. Some will be so entrenched as to seem 
incontrovertible and able to be taken as the bedrock of our world while others will be 
recognised as temporary. But all practices and the kinds of things (including identities) that 
they bring into being are arbitrary in the sense that they could have been otherwise. 
Sustaining a practice requires a continuous reproduction and acceptance of its sayings, 
doings, understandings and physical arrangements all of which are subject to change through 
challenge or altered circumstances. Bourdieu in particular stresses the arbitrariness (Bourdieu 
1992) and it is also illustrated by Hacking, using a Foucauldian approach, in his accounts of 
how kinds of people have been brought into being by practices and how those kinds 
disappear as the practices become unsustainable (Hacking 1995 and 2007). 
But however arbitrary in theory, performance of the roles and achievement of the aims of a 
well entrenched practice are normally experienced as relatively intractable from an individual 
point of view because compliance is part of qualifying as a member of that community - a 
goalkeeper would not last long in a team if he or she did not accept their role as keeping the 
ball from entering the net. As Holland et al (1998) and Holland and Lave (2009) show, 
managing the contradictions of living tolerably within inherited practices requires 
improvisation. Practices are sustainable in so far as they serve the interests of enough 
participants and are sufficiently compatible with the interests of others in the wider social 
system. They would otherwise wither or come under fatal attack in one way or another. 
 
The philosophy of practice shows that who we are and what we do are shaped by our 
inescapable participation in current practices. Those practices are relatively well established 
as they are because they habitually work but also because they are the outcome of historical 
struggles and serve enough interests to warrant being sustained. 
 
In summary integrated practices furnish: 
a. available identities (roles and kinds of people); 
b. a set of intelligible things (kinds of physical entities that fulfil functions 
determined by the purposes of the practice)  
c. a language (i.e. a vocabulary or set of signs associated with that practice, and a 
set of meanings of those signs) to denote these things, identities, kinds, roles 
and arrangements 
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d. understandings that identify the purpose or purposes and, in this sense, the 
meaning of the practice; 
e. ways of doing things that are both pragmatic in relation to ends given within 
the practice but also that express them; 
f. norms and forms of feeling that are appropriate to the sayings, doings and 
understandings and which can guide or provoke action. 
g. A context in which dispersed practices such as questioning, listening, helping, 
betraying,and promising occur. 
 
From this perspective we can understand: 
 
Sentence 1: I am a teacher 
and  
Sentence 2:  What I do is what a teacher does. 
 
as assertions of compliance with and understanding of the currently accepted practice of 
teaching. Further, it helps us to partly understand the two subsequent sentences, 
 
Sentence 3: What I do is what a teacher should do. 
and 
Sentence 4: I am a good teacher. 
 
as acceptance of, or compliance with the criteria of worth purveyed by that particular 
understanding of practice in which they are participating at a particular time. 
 
But practice theory only offers a partial understanding of sentences 3 and 4 for it is equally 
plausible that a teacher uttering such a sentence might wish to imply some freedom from the 
social determination of the practices in which they participate. It is undeniable that the 
practice of individual teachers working in similar positions, teaching the same children, 
experiencing the same demands within the culture of the same school invariably differs in 
significant ways. Individual teaching styles and the ethos of each person’s classroom is 
distinct and recognisable. 
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Given the intense and complex nature of the performance that a teacher has to pull off in 
order to create a sustainable learning community in their classroom it is not surprising that 
those creations all differ. A teacher’s professional practice is constituted by intense forms of 
interaction coloured (as all interactions with other persons are) by their moral commitments, 
emotional dispositions and cognitive understandings.  
 
It is not only the intensity and frequency of interaction but also the nature of the teacher’s 
role because of their responsibility to lead the classroom community. In that mini-society she 
or he has to be, among many other things, setter of moral norms, legislator, diplomat, lawyer, 
policeperson, criminal investigator, advocate (prosecution and defence) and entertainer (to 
maintain morale). The teacher must manage those ‘civic’ responsibilities in such a way as to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of the pupils and ideally their affection too. How they do so will 
inevitably be influenced by, and improvised out of, the idiosyncratic bundle of values, 
attitudes, feelings, dispositions, skills, knowledge, anxieties, identities and beliefs that the 
individual teacher attempts to hold in a bearably coherent self. As life-history studies 
(Goodson 1992) have shown our professional practice is affected by our biography. 
 
It is possible to explain the differences arising from these aspects of professional practice as a 
result of having resources for thinking and acting beyond those provided by the practice of 
their particular school. That such resources are available follows from the fact that each 
individual is a participant in practices other than that of schooling – being a member of a 
religion or political party for example – that may import different and perhaps conflicting 
purposes and criteria of worth setting up a critical relation with how things are done (Coldron 
and Smith 1999). Eschewing psycho-analytic explanations we may call this the theory of 
idiosyncrasy – literally ‘self-mix’ in Greek – where our unique mix of identities, purposes, 
norms etc are nevertheless furnished by the range of practices in which we participate. In this 
way it is possible to stretch the notion of idiosyncrasy to account for the sense of the personal 
that these aspects of practice seem to warrant. But in the next sections we turn to Goodman’s 
nominalistic philosophy to argue that there is an additional and more radical source of a 
personal dimension. 
Goodman on denotation 
How should we understand  
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Sentence 1: I am a teacher 
 in Goodman’s terms? 
The assertion is a matter of denotation - that the person speaking is correctly referred to by 
the word ‘teacher’. His account of denotation is nominalistic. Labels denote. Denotation is 
the successful application of a label to an individual1. An individual may be denoted by any 
label under whose extension it falls. An individual label comes as part of a set of related 
labels or syntactic apparatus - a schema. The set of English words for the three primary 
colours (red, yellow and blue) and three secondary colours (purple, orange and green) is one 
such relatively simple schema. The more numerous (and often more whimsical) names on a 
paint retailer’s colour chart (poppy red, brick red, paprika red etc) offer a more elaborated 
schema naming more things. The label ‘teacher’ may be taken as one label among others in a 
schema of professions such as doctor, lawyer, accountant, etc, or more widely as a schema of 
occupations which would include the previous professions but also many others. 
 
Denotation by a label in Goodman’s analysis may be understood as the equivalence of the 
four statements below (using for clarity the simple colour schema) with A4 the formal 
expression within his system: 
 
A1. ‘Red’ denotes the colour of an English fire engine. 
A2. An English fire engine is red. 
A3. An English fire engine possesses the property of being red.  
A4. The extension of the label ‘red’ includes the colour of an English fire engine. 
 
Goodman explicitly extends reference (including denotation) beyond the linguistic. Not only 
do words operate as labels so can pictures and sounds. For example, pictures of balls, 
skipping ropes, bats and bean bags on a set of boxes for PE equipment may equally well 
denote their contents. Any individual - a word, a picture, a musical sound - can act as a label.  
 
We may ask how it is that red successfully denotes (A1); or that the fire engine is red (A2); or 
that it possesses the property of being red (A3); or that it falls under the extension of the label 
                                                          
1
 By which is meant a logical individual as defined in his system. See (Goodman 1951). 
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‘red’ (A4). But this is a question only indirectly addressed by Goodman. A distinct aspect of 
his system is a radical irrealism - a refusal to countenance any answer to these questions 
beyond an habitually successful but defeasible projection of a label. 
Goodman defines a symbol system as a symbol scheme correlated with a field of reference.  
The symbol scheme is the class of ‘characters’ in the system (the schema) used to refer to 
some object or event. The field of reference of a character is that which is denoted (or 
referred to in some other way) by a character.  So for a standard colour wheel of the three 
primary and three secondary colours showing a different colour in each of twelve discrete 
segments the syntactic element, the schema, is the 12 colour words ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘yellow’, 
‘purple’, ‘orange’, ‘green’, ‘red-orange’, ‘yellow-orange’, ‘yellow-green’, ‘blue-green’, 
‘blue-purple' and the semantic element, the field of reference, is the twelve colors arranged 
on the wheel. In this case both the semantic and syntactic elements are disjoint and finitely 
differentiated. That is, for any one character we can establish which of the regions it denotes 
and for any regions picked out by the pointer we could establish with which character they 
comply.  
 
Now consider another symbol system as represented by another color wheel where there is a 
continuous and gradual change from one color to the next as in the spectrum. This means that 
no matter how small a movement the pointer makes, a change of colour, albeit minute, will 
have occurred. Now this is not markedly different from our previous example if we still take 
the same six colours as the only characters in our scheme i.e. retain the distinct syntactic 
element.  All that we will have done is to make determination of the boundaries in the 
semantic field much more difficult. However we do significantly change the nature of the 
system if we say that for every movement of the pointer, there being a change in colour there 
is a change in character.  We can do this by generating some such additional characters as 
‘yellow-yellow-green’ and ‘green-green-blue’ and ‘yellow-yellow-yellow-green’ and green-
green-green-blue’ and so on. In this case there are an infinite number of characters for 
between any two there will always be a third. Discrimination of characters and the colours 
they denote is impossible to accomplish. Goodman describes such a system as syntactically 
and semantically dense. The result is a practically ineradicable indeterminacy of reference. 
Another example is offered by the difference between a digital thermometer that signals a 
change in temperature using whole numbers and an analogue mercury thermometer in an 
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unmarked tube where even infinitely small movements of the mercury column indicate a 
difference in temperature. 
 
Goodman’s theory provides the means to identify how far and in what ways any symbol 
system complies with or departs from maximal determinacy. To be maximally determinate 
five logically independent conditions must be fulfilled by the system. The syntactic apparatus 
must have characters that are disjoint and finitely differentiated. The compliance classes of 
the semantic field must be disjoint, the semantic field finitely differentiated and there must be 
no semantic ambiguity. Indeterminacy arises when a symbol system is ambiguous or is either 
syntactically or semantically dense, or both, and density is defined in relation to 
differentiation. Unsurprisingly, this places most ordinary languages as often indeterminate. 
 
In The Structure of Appearance (1951) Goodman gives an intricate and technical account of 
the logical relation of the truth status of statements2 which provide a set of clearly defined 
concepts which form the building blocks for his later accounts of induction, representation, 
expression and world making. We do not need to assess the adequacy of these efforts to 
appreciate the fruitfulness and prescience of aspects of his work. He holds that there is no one 
way that the world is and that all we can do is to make decrees about the way things are. This 
threatens an anarchic arbitrariness but we actually achieve a workable stability of meaning 
such that everyday life is sustained. Goodman thinks that this occurs as a result of successful 
habit which results in the projectibility of a sufficient range of sufficiently consistent 
predicates. He describes such predicates as becoming entrenched.  
 
Goodman places the act of concession, the acceptance of a decree, as the final support of any 
assertion. Even though he has characterised such concession as far from being arbitrary it is a 
fundamental tenet of his system that the choice between acceptance and rejection of any 
decree is always open. In addition the exercise of this essential freedom is informed by how 
far it serves our interest. There is no process by which opposing decrees arising from 
conflicting patterns of articulation can ultimately be resolved. 
 
He deliberately does not elaborate on how those interests may be shaped or determined other 
than simply to acknowledge and embrace the conclusion that there are many legitimate 
                                                          
2
 For a full exposition see Coldron (1982) and Shottenkirk (2009). Also Schantz (2009). 
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world-versions. His system thus gives equal logical status to all world-versions which are 
capable of sustaining themselves in the context of all other statements. They maintain their 
status only by asserting predicates projectible within their own version. Any particular 
assertion should not conflict with other assertions that they would wish to uphold. As 
Goodman says, any decree, however unnatural, can be maintained by giving up enough 
others (Goodman 1976). 
 
What does this mean for our understanding of Sentence 1: I am a teacher.? Firstly it 
provides an ontology. The successful projection of the predicate is a teacher is dependent on 
the label teacher being a member of a schema that constitutes a kind. Secondly, the 
projection is necessarily defeasible. Thirdly, the semantic field, the reference of the label 
‘teacher’ is indeterminate because being part of a natural language it departs from maximal 
determinacy. It can play a part in many different schema and without other resources such as 
contextual cues, we cannot fix a workable meaning. And fourthly, to be a sustainable 
assertion those with the power to do so must determine that it is an acceptable decree i.e. 
deem it true, or true enough, for the moment. 
 
We must take due note of the effect of Goodman’s strictures upon decrees. Firstly, he 
emphasises that versions differ in degrees of consistency, subtlety, simplicity and explanatory 
power. He identifies the legitimacy, the acceptability of any decree, with consistency with our 
whole past and future decrees and at the same time links the language we use to make those 
decrees with inherited entrenched patterns. This effectively debars arbitrariness and ensures 
that when two world versions come into conflict there will be important issues of interest at 
stake but also independent criteria for challenge. 
 
Goodman does not reject on principle the possibility of a theory explaining why we make 
certain choices between decrees which ultimately determine our world versions. Goodman is 
concerned with the logical variety of forms of reference; their logical inter-relationships; their 
combinations into powerfully illuminating chains; and the way in which this better 
understanding calls into question our current classifications of things as for example, 
scientific, artistic, affective or cognitive. He offers a re-sorting by offering new categories 
created through new distinctions and a systematic way of understanding why the act of re-
sorting is so powerful a process. 
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He accepts the possibility of a theory of psychological determinism but argues that it is 
unworkable in practice. If psychological determination is accepted in principle then a theory 
of radical social determination might be acceptable and offer a better explanation for some 
choices of classification. A theory that traces operant interest, a central theme of practice 
theory, is compatible with the formal analysis of symbol systems that Goodman develops in 
his work. 
Goodman on Exemplificaton 
A characteristic of denotation highlighted by Goodman is its singular direction of reference 
from a label A to a feature or property B. In denotation labels refer but are not themselves 
referred to by the thing denoted. Samples on the other hand do just that in his formulation. 
Labels denote features that the sample possesses and the sample refers back to (some of) 
those labels.  
If a exemplifies b then (1) a possesses or is denoted by b; and (2) a refers to b. 
The often quoted illustration from Languages of Art is that of the tailor’s swatch. The swatch 
has (possesses) properties of colour, weave etc in so far as it is correctly denoted by labels 
from the differentiated sets of weave-labels (weave-schema), colour-labels (colour-schema) 
etc. And it refers to these labels to exemplify the properties of the different cloths available. 
But it also possesses properties not considered relevant. Its properties are countless but only 
some of them are exemplified because it is used to make reference to only some of the labels 
that denote it. 
 
The labels a sample refers to are usually less determined by precedent than in denotation and 
therefore it is even more important to attend to clues present at time of use. For example the 
properties exemplified (i.e. possessed and referred to) by the tailor’s swatch will vary if the 
interrogative context changes. If it is offered as a sample in response to the question, 'What 
kinds of material are available? the swatch will exemplify certain properties of the different 
kinds of cloth it contains. But if it is offered in response to, 'What is a tailor’s swatch?' it 
would exemplify being a tailor’s swatch even if none of the cloths it contains are currently 
available. And if at another time it was presented as an example of a door stopper the relevant 
properties change again. 
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But there are many cases of samples that appear to have no relevant labels available 
(Dempster 1989) and these seem to stand as counterexamples to Goodman’s analysis. 
Goodman’s answer to this is in terms of self-exemplification and this is one of his most 
fruitful but contested constructs. He uses dance as an illustration. 
…the label a movement exemplifies may be itself; such a movement, having no 
antecedent denotation, takes on the duties of a label denoting certain actions including 
itself.  Here, as often elsewhere in the arts, the vocabulary evolves along with what it is 
used to convey. (Goodman 1976 p64-65) 
What is being exemplified is indeterminate. Indeterminacy arises from the dynamic nature in 
which we determine correct reference and Goodman’s analysis effects a re-description of 
artistic practice as a dynamic, interactive, symbolic activity. Goodman celebrates the 
fecundity of indeterminacy and the vital role of critical reflection and commentary in 
Languages of Art. He says of pictorial exemplification and expression:- 
In any…system with a dense symbol scheme and a dense or unlimited set of reference-
classes, the search for accurate adjustment between symbol and symbolized calls for 
maximal sensitivity, and is unending. (Goodman 1976 p236) 
and of music :- 
....despite the definition of works by scores, exemplification or expression of anything 
beyond the score by a performance is reference in a semantically dense system, and a 
matter of infinitely fine adjustment. (Goodman 1976  p238) 
and of literature:- 
...even though a literary work is articulate and may exemplify or express what is 
articulate, endless search is always required here as in other arts to determine 
precisely what is exemplified or expressed. (Goodman 1976 p240) 
 
Such an analysis gives great importance to contextual clues and the determining influence of 
the host of semi-rules, customs and conventions of (in these instances) artistic practice. He 
also gives joint responsibility for the achievement of meaning to the art object as presented 
and to dialogue about it. 
 
Goodman’s concept of exemplification has been widely criticised on the grounds that the 
implied self-reference leads to paradox and, further, that how a sample refers is fatally 
unclear. A recurring theme has been the difficulty of characterising the way in which the 
sample displays, or picks out from a vast array of candidates, just those that are actually 
exemplified. A kind of indeterminacy, the criticism goes, lies at the heart of the relation and it 
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is difficult to find a formulation that avoids the difficulty. Vermeulen et al (2009) for example 
argue that it should be taken as a basic notion. 
 
Goodman’s formulation of exemplification is we have argued elsewhere (Coldron 1982a and 
1982b) defensible, even within his own strict nominalistic system, but requires an elaboration 
of the role that practices play in his formal system. The most recent defence along these lines 
has been given by Textor (2008) adopting a Gricean account of communicative intentions 
where what labels are exemplified is determined within a context of intentions and actual 
presentation.  
 
We gain a great deal by elaborating the fuller account of the role of context and intention that 
practice theory provides. For the tailor’s swatch to exemplify requires participants to know, 
among other things, how to take and play their roles as customer or vendor; what a shop (and 
more precisely a tailor’s shop) is for and both customer and vendor being aware of and 
knowing how correctly to perform the general practice of promising in which the swatch 
participates. These are the integrated and dispersed practices that constitute a teleo-affective 
project as part of a complex interdependent web of practices. The exemplification of practice-
relevant labels by a tailor’s swatch is a function of its role in such a web of practice and it 
will change its role (i.e. the labels it denotes or exemplifies) when the swatch is used as part 
of a different set of practices. Social practice is crucial in his theory of exemplification 
because it picks out the labels a sample exemplifies from an almost infinite set. Talk of 
practices can easily be transposed into systematic language where the syntactic and semantic 
apparatus and the criteria of projectibility furnished by practices are used in the processes of 
referring by denoting and exemplifying. 
 
Such arguments do not eradicate indeterminacy of reference. As we have seen an ineradicable 
indeterminacy exists in the absence of maximal determinacy (rarely found in natural 
languages) while artistic practices are characterised by a fruitful semantic and syntactic 
density (some of Goodman’s symptoms of the aesthetic). In contrast to arguments that see 
indeterminacy as a weakness it is largely this feature that enables his general theory of 
symbols to contribute so fruitfully when applied in the field of the arts and the social 
sciences. 
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How might Goodman’s concept of exemplification help us to interpret the following 
sentences? 
Sentence 5: I do it my way. 
and  
Sentence  6: The only way for others to comprehend what I do is by showing rather 
than telling.  
Take this example from a teacher talking about his practice. He describes how the experience 
of a particular lesson, in which he read at length from a story by Capote, came to have 
significance for him. 
…the taste of this lesson lingers with me still.  It is the taste of a failed relation. I was 
swept up by the power of my teaching past the bounds of my ordinary judgement, 
defended the teaching to myself despite my own clear sense of its faults, felt compelled 
to write out that long sequence of moments that nearly made me weep, and in the 
process nearly wept again…In the end doubts about this lesson are what I remember 
most. The result is that my memory of the incident has become an exemplar, a 
constituent element of my practical judgement as a teacher. (McDonald 1992: 26) 
The initial sense of the lesson as in some way a failure impelled McDonald to greater 
understanding of what went wrong. He worked at it painstakingly recording each moment in 
order to recognise where he was at fault. By the metaphor of taste he conveys the visceral 
nature of the experience and invites us to consider appropriate forms of understanding - 
should it be sensed rather than analysed? Savoured rather than defined? Absorbed and 
integrated rather than compartmentalised and added? He confesses to a moral laziness and 
self-deceit, being ‘swept up’ past the bounds of his ordinary judgement. 
 
McDonald’s emotionally charged attempt to discover the reality of the lesson is an act of 
transmutation. He constructs his memory of the lesson as an exemplar. This failed lesson 
becomes a sample that exemplifies ‘wrongness’ or more precisely ‘wrongness-as-displayed-
by-this-example’. It is a sample that exemplifies itself. By taking it as a sample McDonald 
has made the experience (which he alone endured) available as a way of labelling (denoting) 
and exemplifying and therefore as a powerful tool for him to categorise and articulate his 
experience. As such it is used by him to discern, to come to know, to re-cognise and 
discriminate. It is also imbued with, and in some part constituted by, feeling which is both a 
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part of the experience itself and a means by which the experience is understood, judged and 
appreciated.  
 
McDonald, we may assume, has constructed many such samples during his career. All 
teachers have their own stock of stories, examples and moments which cumulatively 
contribute to their sense of professional identity and guide their professional practice. Such 
knowledge is, and can only come as, the fruit of experience. Goodman’s theorisation of 
symbols enables us to characterise the difference between the practice of a teacher of long 
standing and that of a novice precisely as the greater articulacy afforded by a more extensive 
means of naming and describing – a richer resource of syntactic and semantic elements. It 
also provides a rigorous account of the notion of reflective practice and the (potential) 
development of connoisseurship at least partly as the creation and deployment of personally 
wrought labels and samples to make a variety of forms of reference in sometimes complex 
strings in particular contexts.  
 
Further, this approach offers a characterisation of a radical personal dimension of teaching. 
The description given here of the way in which a personally tailored language inevitably 
arises from experience implies nothing about the substance of that language or how others 
may assess its effects on practice. Although we may assume this was for him a way of 
becoming a better teacher the affect of this personal labelling need not be what others would 
consider positive. Also a teacher may use such exemplification to retrench their existing 
(perhaps questionable) practice. The wrongness and the rightness that McDonald is now 
better able to discern are his wrongness and rightness. How he comes to adopt his particular 
values and moral positions concerning his professional practice is part of his active social 
location within, and in relation to, the array of discursive resources available to him (Coldron 
and Smith 1999). But the formal account of the kind of reference achieved is the same. And 
crucially, the labels are private and personal in a radical sense although not in principle 
uncommunicable. 
 
As a result of the forms of reference involved – syntactic and semantic density and self-
exemplification - these individually wrought meanings are inherently difficult to 
communicate to others except by further exemplification. As in the arts, a particular event or 
happening has initially no prior denotation and therefore if the teacher uses it as a sample for 
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themselves or, say, to a student teacher assigned to them, it is a label exemplifying itself. This 
is how I propose we understand: 
Sentence 6: The way for others to comprehend what I do is by showing rather than 
telling. 
Without the development of an appreciative critical discourse (analogous to that provided by 
art critics and commentators) it can only be communicated by showing it again. But that of 
course is an extreme and such exemplification, as in the arts, will almost always be in 
conjunction with other forms of reference (such as denotation) constituting a meta-language 
of shared sayings, doings and understandings. How far a teacher develops a personal critical 
language varies but the presence of the dialogue (with oneself and others) required to do so is 
a measure of the level of reflexivity of a teacher or community of professionals. 
 
The tailoring of a personal language from a variety of resources in response to the urgencies 
of everyday life in the classroom offers the possibility that teachers may fashion a critical 
relation to other (including official) discourses. The personal nature of the forms of reference 
used to label experience and the complexity and  mutual interdependency that an ecological 
conception of the nature of practices implies (Kemmis 2010 and 2012) makes the difficulty 
and unpredictability of attempts to ‘improve’ practices understandable. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Focusing as we have on the practice of an individual teacher may seem to lapse into a kind of 
individualism fundamentally at odds with the perspective of practice theory. But we wish 
fully to accept the description of an individual’s practice as constituted within the 
interrelation of interdependent practices – just not wholly constituted. We have attempted to 
show that the deployment of Goodman’s concept of exemplification in conjunction with 
elements of practice theory provides a way of conceptualising practice in both its largest 
possible dimension of socio-historical space and in its smallest dimension of individual 
experience. 
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There is we believe more to be gained from a return in the light of practice theory to 
Goodman’s philosophy and an application of his analysis of forms of reference in educational 
debate and social theory more widely (Douglas 1992). For example we have said nothing 
about his distinction between literal and metaphorical exemplification. If his theory of 
metaphor and expression can be successfully defended, which I think they can, (Coldron 
1982a) and the above arguments about exemplification can be sustained then these together 
may offer useful and interesting ways of conceptualising the metaphorical and affective 
dimensions of social practice and for clarifying what might be meant by the term ‘expressive’ 
commonly used in philosophy and social theory but whose meaning is rarely exposed to 
sufficient analysis. 
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